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Abstract
Cyber-security is used to identify cyber-attacks while they are acting on a computer or network
system to compromise security of the system. We discuss the concept of Hidden Markov Model
with the Large Deviation Theory approaches because now a days statistical anomaly detection with
Large Deviation theory approach have been used to find attack signatures in network traffic. We
present two different approaches to characterize traffic: a model-free approach and a model-based
approach. Model free approach is method of types based approach using Sanov’s theorem whereas
model based approach is HMM based approach uses Large deviation theory. We discuss how these
theories can be applied for anomaly detection from network traffic. We study their effectiveness in
anomaly detection. We will discuss how much these statistical methods affective on spatio-temporal
traffic data. We also discuss about how length of traffic data affect our Markov model. How our
estimated model is related with true but unknown model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A cyber-infrastructure or cloud is a media for exchanging and utilizing information. Cloud contains
digital data and its supporting infrastructure consist of softwares and hardwares, which are being
utilized for traffic flow, data processing, privacy protection, monitoring, supervision and control
etc. This makes it more important to keep it safe. Because many private , national and interna-
tional essential and emergency services needs uninterrupted Internet supply. A cyber attack can
be launched by some anti-social activists, which can compromise the security of any one of the
following systems. Hence it may cause chaos, threat to our economy or national security etc. A
normal or nominal user or a group of users are one who don’t intend to intrude on the cyberspace of
other user. To secure cyberspace of a user or cyber-infrastructure against these anti-social activists
or threats cyber-security professionals and researchers has been engaged in to design a variety of
defense systems. Researchers and Professionals are maintaining confidentiality, availability and in-
tegrity of data from various hackers. The confidentiality refers to the ability to save sensitive data
from third parties, availability refers to do normal tasks like accessing free data or uploading data in
cyberspace. Whereas integrity refers to the a complete cyber-infrastructure without any loopholes.
Generally operating systems like Windows have there own firewall and security system for pro-
tection against malicious cyber attacks or viruses. They have there own cryptography which protects
user information. People also uses anti-virus softwares for their system or infrastructure for pro-
tection against threats. These approaches are used to create a shield for users. However these
methods appears to be not fully protective because of flaws in design or flaws in hardware or soft-
ware infrastructure. Researchers always tries to patch up those flaws but attackers always finds a
way through these security systems. For all these reasons we need better methodology for a reliable
cyber protection. Blocks of a better cyber defense system can be shown as:
As shown in figure 1.1 feature extraction, their analysis and decision making are most important
steps of attack detection. Feature extraction contains all information like IP addresses of source and
destination, protocol, ports of source and destination, time and duration of data, number of packets
etc. Analysis part has different methods to detect anomalous behavior which system haven’t seen
before. The decision statement is made when analysis method catches some anomalous behavior.
Traditionally human analysts watch over these sequence of alerts given by cyber attack identifi-
cation system and signals attack accordingly. But this is a difficult and time consuming task for an
analyst when number of alerts generated are very high. This task becomes more difficult when en-
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Figure 1.1: Steps of Cyber security
vironment changes rapidly. Machine learning is a good approach for cyber attack detection because
it could deal with above problems effectively. First it gathers knowledge from the training data and
then makes predictions on new data based on knowledge gained from previous data. This makes
machine learning approach more efficient.
Cyber attack detection system (CADS) monitors the activities that occurs in a computing resource
to detect violations of security policies of an organization. The intention of CADS can be summarized
as follows:
• Increase attack detection rate also called True Positive (TP) i.e. Detect most of the attacks
(Malicious or non-malicious, external opportunistic or deliberate attacks).
• Reduce false alarm rates also called False Positive (FP) i.e. accuracy of attack detection should
be very high.
• Detect attacks in shortest time, thus to reduce damage caused by the attacks.
The above requirements have involved researchers to develop different machine learning algo-
rithms that fulfill above goals to prevent systems from cyber attack.
Before proceeding lets talk what is machine learning. Machine learning is about automatic learn-
ing of models from sample data. It is a computational process where learning models uses rules or
mathematical functions or logics for finding relationship between input and output. That is suppose
we have an observed dataset X, parameters θ and a model f(θ). Then in machine learning we try
to minimize errors E(f(θ), X) between truth and the learning model f(θ). In general we have a
predicted output from the model f(θ) and observed sample data. We calculate the errors and use
optimization algorithms to find accurate parameters θ for the accuracy of our learning model f(θ).
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A CADS generally has to deal with problems like large network traffic volumes which is continuously
varying with time because of human activity, highly uneven data and the difficulty to realize deci-
sion boundaries between normal and abnormal data and a requirement for continuous adaptation
to a constantly changing environment. Generally the challenge is to efficiently classify behaviors of
network systems. There are two general approaches for classifying behaviors of a network system
for cyber attacks detection:
• Pattern recognition
• Anomaly detection
These two method work in complementation of each other.
1.1 Patttern Recognition
Pattern recognition is a supervised machine learning approach. Pattern-recognition techniques iden-
tify and store signature patterns of known attacks. Then they match the subject’s observed behav-
ior with patterns of known attack signatures and signal attacks when there is a match. Pattern-
recognition techniques have been used in many places. Attack signatures can be characterized as
strings, event sequences, activity graphs, or attack scenarios. Different types of rules, state transi-
tion diagrams or decision trees are used to match or identify pattern of attack signatures. Although
pattern recognition is useful for known attacks but it can’t stop novel or unusual attacks Therefore
attack signature patterns needs to be updated timely manner to remain useful in this dynamic world
where attack scenarios, protocol or configuration always keep on changing.
Pattern recognition approach uses different machine learning algorithms such as artificial neu-
ral networks(ANN), genetic programing (GP), support vector machines(SVM), Fuzzy rules based
methods. Such methods uses Bayesian network (BN), classification and regression tree or decision
tree based approach for feature extraction. These methods are being used for attack detection. But
these all methods as told are ineffective towards novel attacks. These methods also have irregular
performance for different attack types. So we need a different and little more concrete approach for
attack detection which can overcome these characteristics.
1.2 Anomaly Detection
For a subject like a user or host machine or network of interest an anomaly-detection technique is
consisting of establishing a norm profile, observe the activities of the subject and signal attacks when
the subject’s observed activities differ appreciably from its norm profile. So anomaly method can
stop unusual and novel attack but it also have a drawback that it gives false alarm when it comes
across an irregular behavior, which need not to be an anomaly. Pattern recognition and anomaly
detection techniques can improve detection capability when used together. One of the technique is
statistically anomaly detection technique is discussed in this report. It construct a statistical profile
of a subject’s normal activity from historic data. Many cyber-attacks require a series of related
events to accomplish, it is possible to improve attack detection performance by incorporating the
ordering of events. But statistical profile many times do not consider the in which event occurs
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to the subject. In a paper I have studied that Markov model are computationally intensive due to
their use of the Bayes parameter estimation for learning the norm profile and a likelihood ratio test
for inferring anomalies. Considering large amounts and high frequency of events in a computer
and network system, those techniques are not applicable to cyber-attack detection in real time.
Previously they had used Markov Chain (MC) model in [1], [2], for attack detection. But now a
days as our computer’s computational efficiency have been increased they have started researching
with s-step Markov process. Markov chain process with s-step Markov process have been discussed
in chapter 2 of this report.
1.3 Note
In this report anomaly detection method is described with some procedures because those papers
contains details regarding anomaly detection method only. And also earlier work has showed that
systems based on pattern matching had detection rates below 70% [3], [4] Furthermore, such sys-
tems need constant (and expensive) updating to keep up with new attack signatures. As a result,
more attention has to be drawn to methods for traffic anomaly detection since they can identify even
novel (unseen) types of anomalies.
4
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
A lot of research is done on Network anomaly detection. And still a lot of research is being carried
out to make network anomaly detection perfect. In this section we will discuss approximately all
anomaly detection methods that are in research and has been carried out till now. We will go
through hows their modeling is done, how they work and their efficiency towards network anomaly
detection. Let us start with the statistical approach then we will move towards the deterministic
approach. As per statistical approach [2], [5], [6] and [7], we have found that statistical approach
gives satisfactory result. Though research is being carried out to check whether these satisfactory
results could provide perfect results. We have two types of statistical approaches.
• Model free approach
• Model based approach
In the upcoming sections we will see these approaches in details. Before moving forward let
us see the network topology we need to monitor. We monitor a computer or a router for anomaly
detection. So instead of calling them router, computer or traffic, lets say we are observing a system.
Because these approaches we going to see, can be easily implemented on any of them. There are
four different representations of data to be observed.
• Bytes
• Packets
• Flows
• Windows
A collection of Bytes forms a Packet, a collection of packets forms a flow and a collection of
flow forms a window. We use flow and window based methods for attack detection. The traffic has
variations in data flow due to human activity. Lets take an example of flow representation in traffic.
Each flow consist of IP address (x), transmission time (t), size of the data in flow (d) and duration
of flow (df ). As we know each user is known by its IP address. When number of users becomes very
high then it becomes nearly impossible to characterize the behavior of each user. So as to simplify
this situation we form user groups to manage behavior. We use clustering algorithm to form user
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groups. Each user group has a cluster center and each user has spectral distance from the user.
These clusters can be represented as:
f = (k(x), g(x), d, df ) (2.1)
Where k(x) represents the cluster label and g(x) represents the distance of cluster center from the
user x. Suppose xi = (xi1, x
i
2, x
i
3, x
i
4) ∈ {0, ..., 255}4 and xj = (xj1, xj2, xj3, xj4) ∈ {0, ..., 255}4 are two
i.p. addresses. Then their distance is given by g(xi, xj) =
∑4
k=1 256
4−k|xik − xjk|. g(x) can be given
as g(x, x¯k). Where x¯k represent kth cluster center. In this representation it is clear that we are using
cluster label, distance between i.p. addresses, download rate or data transfer rate i.e. d/df , data
size and duration of flow as features.
Whereas there is another representation of traffic. As we have seen that IP addresses was one
way to form cluster center. But other then IP address clusters can also be formed based on number
of flows. So we can represent network as:
f = (nf (x), h(x), d, df ) (2.2)
Where nf (x) represents the number of flows user x have with the server or cluster center. h(x)
represents the distance of user from the server or cluster center. So here we can see that this method
can be applied to those systems which work with a The first way of representation is used for
techniques such as statistical and support vector machine anomaly detection. Whereas the second
way of traffic representation is used for some other techniques such as Adaptive resonance theory
based anomaly detection method.
Upcoming sections are arranged as follows. First we go through some important terms of HMM
and LDT in section 2.1 and 2.2. Because these explanation will help us to understand statistical
anomaly detection method. Section 2.3 and 2.4 describes those statistical approach i.e. model
free approach and Markov model based approach for anomaly detection respectively. Section 2.5
describes how the above statistical approaches can be extended from temporal anomaly detection
to spatio-temporal anomaly detection. In section 2.6 we will study about support vector machine
approach for anomaly detection.
2.1 Hidden Markov Model
A stochastic process is defined as a sequence of random variables X = x1, ......, xn for n → ∞. As
we know x takes values in from a finite set. Let’s say the set A is a finite set of cardinality n. Set A
can be written as A = a1, ....., an . Here we will define a Markov chain model and their associated
terms and then s-step Markov model.
2.1.1 Markov Chain
A process {Xt}∞t=0 is said to be a Markov chain if for every t ≥ 0 and every sequence a0, ...., at ∈ N t+1
we can say
Pr{Xt = at|X0 = a0, .......Xt−1 = at−1} = Pr{Xt = at|Xt−1 = at−1} (2.3)
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In a Markov process the length of the tail on which the conditioning is carried out is always one. In
Markov process if the current state i ∈ A, the next state j ∈ A , then we can define the quantity
aij(t) as
aij(t) = Pr{Xt = j|Xt−1 = i}, i, j ∈ A. (2.4)
Where aij(t) is the probability of making transition from the current state i at time t to the next state
j at time t+ 1. A n×n matrix A(t) = aij(t) is said to be state transition matrix of Markov process at
time t. The matrix is said to be homogeneous if it is a constant matrix and independent of time and
non-homogeneous otherwise. A(t) is a stochastic matrix for all t. That is:
aij(t) ∈ [0, 1] and
∞∑
j=1
aij = 1 ∀i, j ∈ A (2.5)
Suppose {Xt} is a Markov process in a state space N and we don’t know state transition matrix.
Let’s say A is the unknown STM. We have observed Markov process sequence as xl1 = {x1, ......., xl}.
Now by this observation we would like to evaluate the terms of state transition matrix that makes
this observed sequence most likely. So we evaluate likelihood of the observed sequence xl1 if A is the
state transition matrix of the underlying Markov processes. The likelihood can be written as:
L(xl1|A) = Pr{x1}
l∏
t=2
Pr{xt|xt−1} = Pr{x1}
l∏
t=2
axt−1xt (2.6)
Taking log both sides and after further simplification it can be written as:
LL(xl1|A) = logPr{x1}+
l∑
t=2
logaxt−1xt = logPr{x1}+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
vij logaij
Here vij denote the number of times state sequence ij appears in the sample path xl1. And we are
writing precisely aij = axt−1xt times. Now we have the constraint equation as well:
∑n
j=1 aij =
1∀i ∈ N . Then the updated objective equation can written with Lagrangian as:
LL(xl1|A) = logPr{x1}+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
vij logaij +
n∑
t=1
λt(1−
n∑
j=1
aij)
Now we want to minimize this objective function. Then we get the following conclusions:
∂J
∂aij
=
vij
aij
− λi = 0
⇒ aij = vij
λi
.
Now after further solving this equation we can get a closed form solution. Because it is readily
available to us from the constrained equation:
n∑
j=1
aij = 1⇒
n∑
j=1
vij
λi
= 1⇒ λi =
n∑
j=1
vij = vi
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Therefore maximum likelihood estimate of the given matrix A is given by:
aij =
vij
vi
(2.7)
Eq. (2.7) gives the state transition matrix values. But it contains a lot of zeros. To avoid zero entries
in state transition matrix we do some adjustments in the matrix. Because the sample path with zero
entries gives a likelihood zero or log-likelihood of minus infinity. To avoid this anomaly we make
some adjustments. These adjustments are called Laplacian Correction.
2.1.2 s-step Markov process
s-step Markov process is also same as Markov chain with one difference. In s-step Markov process
the length of the tail on which the condition is done is s instead of one as in Markov chain process. A
process {Xt}∞t=0 is said to be a s-step Markov if for every t ≥ 1 and every sequence a0, ......., at ∈ N t+1
we can say:
Pr{Xt = at|X0 = a0, .......Xt−1 = at−1} = Pr{Xt = at|Xt−1t−s = at−1t−s} (2.8)
We can convert s-step Markov process to Markov chain process by changing the state space to Ns.
We can define Zt as Zt = Xtt−s+1. Then Zt is defined over a block of s-states. Therefore Zt is a
Markov Process over state space Ns. Now equation (2.8) can be written as:
Pr{Zt = u|Zt−1 = v} = Pr{Xt = at|Zt− 1 = v} (2.9)
Here u = (at−s+1, ....., at) and v = (at−s, ....., at−1). As v is previously known so first (s − 1)
terms of u are already known. Therefore 2.9 is valid from that point of view. As u, v ∈ Ns. So this
time state transition matrix can be written as ns × ns matrix. Here only n components in a row will
be non-zero and other entries are zero because components corresponding to v are only non-zero.
2.1.3 Recurrent and Transient states
A state is said to be recurrent state in a Markov process if during transition from one state to another
state, the process attain a state where it can’t further attain any other state and form a loop for all
t ≥ k. Here k represents the time instant at which the state attains recurrent state. Set of all states
excluding recurrent states are called transient states. Now as it was discussed earlier that {Xt} is a
Markov process assuming values in a finite set N of cardinality n and A(t) denote the state transition
matrix at time t. If c0 is its initial distribution. Then state A(t) is distributed according to
A(t) = c0A(1)A(2), ....., A(t− 1) (2.10)
Now if the system attains a recurrent state at time T . If pi is that stationary state or vector then for
all t ≥ T we can write the above equation as:
pi ×A(T ) = A(t)
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Here pi is called the stationary distribution of A(t). Now we want to know whether a given stochastic
matrix A have a stationary distribution and if it have then how to determine the set of all stationary
distributions. For that we need to follow a theorem given in [ [8], Theorem 4.7]. Some part of it is
described here. For full details please go through the reference.
2.1.4 spectral radius
Given a matrix A, the spectrum of A consists of all eigenvalues of A and is denoted by spec(A). If
spec(A) = λ1, ........, λn, then
ρ(A) = max{|λi| : λi ∈ spec(A)}
is called the spectral radius of A. Spec(A) can’t contain negative and complex numbers. ρ(A) is
always real and non-negative.
2.1.5 Canonical Form of a matrix
Suppose A ∈ <n×n+ is a non-negative matrix. Then to capture the location of positive elements in
the matrix we form an incidence matrix T corresponding to A:
T ∈ {0, 1}n×n, tij = 1 ∀aij > 0
= 0 ∀aij = 0
Since A has n rows and columns, we can think of N := 1, ....., n as the set of nodes of a directed
graph and place a directed edge from node i to node j if and only if tij = 1. A path length l from
node i to node j is a sequence of length l + 1 of the form {i0, ........, il}, where i0 = i, il = j, and in
addition aisis+l > 0 for all s = 0, 1, .....l. Now if a
l
ij denote the ijth element of A
l. Therefore from
matrix multiplication formula:
alij =
n∑
s1=1
......
n∑
sl−1=1
ais1as1s2 .......asl−1j
Now it is obvious that alij > 0 if and only if there is a path from node i to node j. A node i is
said to be inessential if there exists a node j (of necessity, not equal to i) such that i → j, but
j 6→ i. Otherwise, i is said to be essential. With the above definition, we can divide the set of nodes
N = {1, ...., n} into two disjoint sets: ι denoting the set of inessential nodes and ε denoting the set
of essential nodes. Now after similarity transformation A can be converted in such a way that all
nodes in ε comes first, followed by all nodes in ι. Let Π denote the permutation matrix then the
matrix A can be written as:
Π−1AΠ =
ε ι
ε P 0
ι R Q
(2.11)
Then from [ [8], Theorem 4.7, statement 8] it can be written as: If c ∈ Sn be an arbitrary initial
distribution. If ι is non-empty, permute the component of c to be compatible with eq. (2.10), and
write c = [cεcι]. Partition ct = cAt as ct = [c
(t)
ε c
(t)
ι ] . Then c
(t)
ι →∞ as t→∞, irrespective of c.
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To proof this as its written above if ι is non-empty, and m = |ι| denote the cardinality of ι. Then
partition Am as:
Am =
ε ι
ε Pm 0
ι R(m) Qm
Then we can say that each row of R(m) contains a nonzero element. Then we can say each row
sum of Qm is strictly less than one. Now as we have seen earlier that ρ(A) ≤ r(A) = µ(A) ≤ 1 [8].
Where A is a stochastic matrix with each row sum equal to one. In this case µ(Qm) ≤ 1. So we can
say that ρ(A) ≤ 1. Since ρ(Qm) = ρ(Q)m, it follows that ρ(Q) ≤ 1. If A is in the form eq. (2.10) and
ι is non-empty, then At has the form:
At =
ε ι
ε P t 0
ι R(t) Qt
Now we know that ρ(Q) ≤ 1 from the above explanation. And also Qt →∞ as t→∞. Hence if we
write ct = cAt , then it implies that:
ctι = cιQ
t → 0 ∀t→∞
Irrespective of the value cιhave initially. Therefore we can conclude that the states in ι are referred
as transient states and those in ε are referred as recurrent states. Therefore we can conclude that
irrespective of the initial distribution of the Markov chain, we have:
Pr{Xt ∈ ι} → 0 ∀t→∞
Pr{Xt ∈ ε} → 1 ∀t→∞
So we can say that set ε are recurrent states, and these disjoint equivalence classes ε1, ........, εs are
referred as communicating classes.
2.2 Large Deviation Theory
In this section we will discuss about Sanov’s theorem [8] for i.i.d. sequence as well as Markov
chain sequence. For that earlier we need to define a few things, which are as follows. Suppose
A = {a1.......an} is a finite set. M(A) denote the set of all probability distributions on the set A.
µ ∈ M(A) is a fixed but possibly unknown probability distribution and X is a random variable
assuming values in A with distribution µ. In order to estimate µ we generate independent samples
x1.....xl...., where each sample xi belongs to set A, and distributed according to µ and independent
of xj for j 6= i. Let we have generated samples from first l experiments. Then we used to construct
empirical distribution as follows:
(µˆl1)i =
1
l
l∑
j=1
I{xj = ai} (2.12)
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Where I denote the indicator function. Now (µˆ)lx=1 is also a probability distribution on A and a
random element of M(A). Thus we think as l → ∞ the process converges to the true measure
µ that is generating the samples. Let us define γ ∈ M(A) is some set of probability distribution
and (µˆ)lx=1 ∈ γ is a sequence of real numbers. Now suppose that µ 3 γ¯, where set γ¯ denotes the
closure of set γ in the total variation metric. Thus the true measure µ that is generating the random
samples does not belong to the closure of set γ. If µ 3 µˆ then we can say that the sequence of real
numbers Pr{µˆ}lx=1 converges to zero. Large deviation theory tells us the rate at which the sequence
converges to zero and how the rate depends on γ and µ. Suppose this sequence converges to zero
at an exponential rate, that is
Pr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} = c1exp(−lc2)
Here c2 is called rate of convergence. Now taking log both side we can write:
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} =
logc1
l
− c2
As we can see that as l → ∞ the negative of this quantity approaches to c2. Now let us define the
rate function.
2.2.1 Rate function
Let µˆ(xl1) be defined as in (2.12). Then the function I : M(A)→ <+ is said to be a rate function of
the stochastic process µˆ(xl1) if
• I is lower semi-continuous.
• For every set γ ⊆M(A), the relationship holds:
− inf
v∈γ0
I(v) ≤ lim
l→∞
inf
1
l
logPr{ ˆµ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≤ lim
l→∞
sup
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≤ − inf
v∈γ¯ I(v)
(2.13)
Where γ0 denote interior of the set γ. Again a function f : M(A) → < is said to be lower semi-
continuous if
vi → v∗ → f(v∗) ≤ lim
i
inf f(vi)
2.2.2 Sanov’s theorem
Let us first understand method of types. Let us fix the integer l denote the length of the multi-sample.
So now empirical distribution can take finite values as shown in equation (2.12), and every element
of µˆ(x)l1 is a rational number with l in denominator. Let ε(l, n) denote the set of all possible empirical
distribution that can result from the multi-sample of length l and set A = a1......an has cardinality
n. And we define two multi-sample to be equivalent if their empirical estimates are equal. T (v, l)
represent type class v of the multi-sample. Then we can say that [8]:
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• Cardinality of |ε(l, n)| is given by:
|ε(l, n)| = (l + n− 1)!
l!(n− 1)! (2.14)
• The log likelihood of each multi-sample in T (v, l) is given by:
logP lµ{x} = −lJ(v, µ) (2.15)
Where J(v, µ) known as loss function. (Defined below.)
• The cardinality of T (v, l) is given by:
|T (v, l)| = l!∏n
i=1 li
(2.16)
• Lower and upper bound of |T (v, l)| is given by:
|ε(l, n)|−1 exp[lH(v)] ≤ |T (v, l)| ≤ exp[lH(v)], ∀v ∈ ε(l, n) (2.17)
Where H(v) denote entropy of distribution v.
2.2.3 Loss function
Loss function between two probability measure µ and v is defined as:
J(v|µ) =
n∑
i=1
vi log
1
µi
Where n represents cardinality of set A = a1, .....an. This function have minimum value Jmin when
v = µ. Otherwise the difference between this Jmin and J (when v 6= µ) is known as Kullback
Laibler divergence i.e.
D(v||µ) = J(v|µ)− J(v|v)[whenv = µ, Jmin]
2.2.4 Sanov’s Theorem for i.i.d. processes
The stochastic process µˆ(x)l1 satisfies Large deviation property with the rate function I(v) = D(v||µ).
Where D(v||µ) is called Kullback Laibler Divergence. Proof: As first condition for rate function is it
should be lower semi-continuous function. But here I(v) is not only lower semi-continuous but in
fact its continuous function v. So now we need to proof the second criteria i.e. inequality criteria as
told in section 2.1 point 2. Suppose v ∈ ε(l, n). Now we need to evaluate the probability of empirical
distribution µˆ(xl1) to be equal to v.
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v} = Prlµ(T (v, l)) = |T (v, l)|Prlµ({xl1})
Here the sequence x1......xl is generated by some unknown frequency µ we are trying to estimate
and v is the estimated frequency, i.e. {xl1} ∈ T (v, l). Now from equation (2.14) and from right
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inequality of equation (2.17) we can write:
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v} = |T (v, l)|Prlµ({xl1}) ≤ exp |lH(v)| exp−lJ(v, µ) = exp [−lD(v||µ)] (2.18)
Similarly using (2.15) and the left inequality (2.17) we can write:
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v} = |T (v, l)|Prlµ({xl1}) ≥ |ε(l, n)|−1 exp |lH(v)| exp−lJ(v, µ) = |ε(l, n)|−1 exp [−lD(v||µ)]
(2.19)
Combination of equation (2.18) and (2.19) we can write it as:
|ε(l, n)|−1 exp [−lD(v||µ)] ≤ Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v} ≤ exp [−lD(v||µ)]
This above equation gives the lower limit and upper limit for µˆ(xl1) ∈ T (v, l). Now since γ ∈ M(A)
is any probability distribution on A. Then using (2.19)
Pr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} =
∑
v∈γ∩ε(l,n)
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v}
≤ |γ ∩ ε(l, n)| sup
v∈γ∩ε(l,n)
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v}
≤ |ε(l, n)| sup
v∈γ
exp [−lD(v||µ)]
Hence it can be written by taking log both sides and divide by l throughout the equation:
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≤
1
l
log |ε(l, n)|+ sup
v∈γ
−D(v||µ) (2.20)
As we know the number of experiments should be a large number. So we can write that l >> n. So
we can write that |l + n − 1| ≤ |2l|. But if we think that l must be at least equal to n. Then (2.14)
can be modified as:
|ε(l, n)| = (l + n− 1)!
l!(n− 1)! ≤
(2l)!
(n− 1)!l! =
(2l)(n−1)
(n− 1)! ∀l ≥ n
So we can say from above equation that as l→∞ first term of equation 2.20 approaches zero. Since
γ ⊆ γˆ so the rest of the equation can be written as:
lim
l→∞
sup
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≤ sup
v∈γ
−D(v||µ) ≤ − inf
v∈γˆ
D(v||µ)
This constitutes the right hand part of the (2.13) as given in the definition of the rate function. Now
to prove left hand part of the definition as given in (2.13) we assume φ is a probability distribution in
M(A). We have got this distribution after performing l experiments. So we are assuming φ ∈M(A)
is same as v ∈ M(A), but two outcome of same experiment. So we can say that every φi ∈ φ and
every vi ∈ v is a rational number with denominator l. Now lφi and lvi both are integer values. Now
let us define qi = dlφie and ri = blφic. Now if we assume ci equal to either qi or ri for each index
i. Then we can say that
∑n
i=1 ci = l. Then we can say that type class v can be written as vi = ci/l.
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Now from the above equation it can be written as radius of total variation metric φ as:
ρ(φ, v) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
|φi − ci| ≤ n
2l
Now suppose v is an interior point in γ and B(v) represents open ball in γ that contains v. Let there
exists a sequence {vl} ∈ ε(l, n) for all l. And vl → v as l → ∞. Also vl ∈ (v) for sufficiently large l.
Then from (2.19) we can write:
Pr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ Pr{µˆ(xl1) = vl} ≥ |ε(l, n)|−1 exp [−lD(vl||µ)]
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ −
1
l
log |ε(l, n)| −D(vl||µ)
As seen earlier that the first term on the right hand side approaches zero as l → ∞. Now suppose
γ0 ⊆ γ.Then we can write:
− inf
vl∈γ
D(v||µ) ≥ − inf
vl∈γ0
D(v||µ)
So as l→∞ we have seen earlier that vl → v. Then above equation can ve written as:
lim
l→∞
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ − inf
v∈γ0
D(v||µ)
This proves the left inequality of the definition of the rate function. Therefore it can be concluded
that Kullback-Laibler is the rate function for finite alphabets.
2.2.5 Large deviation theory for Markov chain
Previously we studied Sanov’s theorem for an i.i.d. sequence. Here we will discuss Sanov’s theorem
for Markov chain sequence. Because Sanov’s theorem is key in cyber security project. As we have
seen earlier that if we have s-step Markov process of cardinality N . Then we can transform that
s-step Markov process into Markov chain process of cardinality Ns. In this new Markov chain only
transition matrix gets converted from n× n to ns × ns.
2.2.6 Entropy rate
Suppose {Xt}t≥0 is a stationary stochastic process assuming values in finite alphabetA = {a0, ......, an}.
Then entropy rate of the process is given by Hr(Xt), and defined as [8]:
Hr({Xt}) = lim
t→∞H
(
Xt
Xt−10
)
(2.21)
Where H(.) is the conditional entropy. Suppose X and Y are random variables assuming values in
finite set A = a1......an and B = b1......bm respectively. φ ∈ Snm denote their joint probability distri-
bution. φx ∈ Sn and φy ∈ Sm denote the marginal probabilities of variables X and Y respectively.
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Then conditional entropy of Y with respect to X is given by:
H
(
Y
X
)
=
n∑
i=1
(φx)iH(φY |x=ai)
It can also be written as:
H(Y/X) = H(X,Y )−H(Y )
Therefore as per given definition of Entropy rate and property of conditional probability it can be
written as:
Hr({Xt}) = lim
t→∞H(Xt/X
t−1
0 ) = limt→∞H(X
t
0)−H(Xt−10 )
Here we need to know that if {Xt}t≥0 is a stationary stochastic process assuming values in a finite
alphabet A. Time average of Entropy rate approaches a constant value c ≥ 0 as t→∞. That is [8]:
H
(
Xt
Xt−10
)
→ c ∀t→∞ (2.22)
Entropy rate for a Markov process is given by [8]:
Hr(v) =
n∑
i=1
viH(ai) (2.23)
2.2.7 Relative Entropy rate
Suppose {Xt} and {Yt} are two stationary stochastic processes assuming values in a common finite
set A. Then the relative entropy rate is defined as:
Dr({Xt}||{Yt}) = lim
t→∞
D(Xt0||Y t0 )
t
(2.24)
If limit exists then only relative entropy rate will be defined otherwise not defined. Like entropy
rate, relative entropy rate can also be written as [8]:
Dr(v||µ) = D(v||µ)−D(v¯||µ¯)
Here v, µ ∈ M(Ak) probability distribution on Ak. Whereas v¯, µ¯ ∈ Mk−1 are probability distribu-
tion on Ak−1. There is a difference of one dimension in between them. Mathematically it can be
represented as:
v¯i =
∑
j∈A
vij =
∑
j∈A
vji
Like entropy rate, relative entropy rate of Markov process is given by [8]:
Dr(v||µ) =
n∑
i=1
v¯iD(ai||bi) (2.25)
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Where ai and bi are ith row of transition matrix A and B.
2.2.8 Rate function for Markov Process
Here we discuss about the doublet frequency because every frequency can be further transformed
into doublet frequency. {Xt} is a Markov process from a finite set called A ∈ Sn. After observing
l experiments we have an output x1......xl. Let φl1 denote the empirical estimate of l observations.
Then we can write:
φi(x
l
1) =
1
l
l∑
j=1
Ixj=i ∀i ∈ A (2.26)
Here φ is an approximation of stationary distribution of the Markov chain. Since we are working on
doublet frequency. So we can define:
θij =
1
l − 1
l−1∑
k=1
IxkXk+1=ij (2.27)
Here we can say that θ ∈M(A2) is an estimate of the true estimate φ ∈M(A2) which are generating
doublet frequencies. As defined earlier that as θ ∈ S2n, therefore θ¯ ∈ Sn. But θ¯ is not a stationary
distribution. Because as per definition of stationary distribution:
θ¯i =
n∑
j=1
θij 6=
n∑
j=1
θji
As we can see that its a non-stationary function. We make this a stationary function by making an
assumption that the outcome of (l+ 1)th is the first observation and make it a cyclic path. Therefore
the sample path-length will be l + 1. So the new estimate is given by:
vij =
1
l
l∑
k=1
Ixkxk+1=ij (2.28)
Here v is a always stationary unlike θ. Here again we start with method of types to evaluate rate
function for Markov process. Suppose µˆ(xl1) is the empirical measure as defined in (2.28). If two
observations have the same empirical estimates then we can say that they are of same type. Let us
define ε(l, n, 2) ⊆ ε(l, n2). Since every distribution in ε(l, n2) are not stationary. So we have selected
ε(l, n, 2) of sample length l and of finite alphabet of length l. As earlier defined T (v, l) define the
type class v = µˆ(xl1) ∈ ε(l, n, 2). Therefore we can say [8]:
• The cardinality of ε(l, n, 2) is given by:
|ε(l, n, 2)| ≤ (l + 1)n2 (2.29)
• The cardinality of type class T (v, l) is given by:
(2l)2n
2
exp lHr(v) ≤ |T (v, l)| ≤ l exp lHr(v) (2.30)
Where Hr(.) is the entropy rate function.
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• The log likelihood of T (v, l) is given by:
logPrX l1 = x
l
1 = l[J(v|µ)− J(v¯|µ¯)] (2.31)
Here v represents v(xl1) and v¯ represents v¯
l
1 as defined in 2.28.
From (2.30) and (2.31) we can tell that:
log |T (v)| ≤ lHr(v)
log |T (v, l)| ≤ l(J(v|µ)− J(v¯|µ¯))
So from the above equations if we write that:
δ(v, l) =
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) = v}
Then it can be written as:
δ(v, l) ≤ Hr(v)− J(v|µ) + J(v¯|µ¯) + o(1/l)
= H(v)−H(v¯)− J(v|µ) + J(v¯|µ¯) + o(1/l)
= −Dr(v||µ) + o(1/l)
(2.32)
similarly it can be written using the left inequality of (2.30) and (2.31) as:
δ(v, l) ≥ −Dr(v||µ) + o(1/l) (2.33)
Therefore we can say that if γ ⊆ M(A2) be any set of the probability distribution in A2. Then we
can write:
Pr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} =
∑
v∈ε(l,n,2)∩γ
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v}
≤ |ε(l, n, 2) ∩ γ| sup
v∈ε(l,n,2)∩γ
Pr{µˆ(xl1) = v}
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≤
1
l
log |ε(l, n, 2)|+ sup
v∈γ
δ(l, v)
lim sup
l→∞
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≤ sup
v∈γ
−Dr(v||µ) = − inf
v∈γDr(v||µ)
This is the right inequality of the rate function as given in (2.13). Now suppose v ∈ γ. B(v) is an
open ball in M(A2) that contains v. Now there exists a sequence of elements {vl} ∈ γ ∩ ε(l, n, 2).
Now as we know as l→∞,vl → v. Therefore we can write that:
Pr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ Pr{µˆ(xl1) = vl}
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ δ(l, vl)
≥ −Dr(vl||µ) + o(1/l)
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Therefore it can be written that:
lim inf
l→∞
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ −Dr(v||µ) ∀v ∈ γ0
lim inf
l→∞
1
l
logPr{µˆ(xl1) ∈ γ} ≥ sup
v∈γ0
−Dr(v||µ) = − inf
v∈γ0
−Dr(v||µ)
Where γ0 ⊆ γ. So this proves the left inequality of the rate function as given in (2.13). Therefore
we can conclude that relative entropy rate (Dr(v||µ)) act as a rate function in Markov processes.
2.3 Model Free Approach
Model free approach is a statistical approach. Here we treat the sequence of data flow through
the system is an i.i.d. sequence. As per this approach sliding window is applied on the sequence
of data. Let f i = (k(xi), g(xi), di, dif ) represents a flow attribute in the sequence of data flow
as discussed earlier in network traffic data representation part. Lets say Fj = {f1, f2, ...., fFj}
represents sequence of flows in jth window. Similar to Fj we assume that we have used Fref for
training or as reference. Now first we quantize each reference flow of reference windows to to
a closest symbol in discrete alphabet say
∑
. Lets say these discrete symbols are represented as∑
(ω) = {σ(f1), σ(f2), ....., σ(fFj )}.
Now empirical measure of current flow sequence F = {f1, f2, ...., fF } is evaluated as frequency
distribution vector:
EF (ρ) = 1|F |
|F |∑
i=1
1{σ(f i) = ρ} (2.34)
Where 1{.} denotes the indicator function and σ(f i) denotes the flow state in ∑ that f i maps to.
Now as we know that we have probability vector from reference flows Fref . And just now we have
calculated probability vector from empirical measure using (2.34). Lets say that µ(σ) is the reference
probability measure of flow state σ. Then we use Sanov’s theorem [8] to compare these probability
vectors.
Suppose ν is the estimated probability vector after quantization of flows. Then with the help of
Sanov’s theorem we can check normality with the equation as:
H(ν|µ) =
∑
σ∈∑ ν(σ)log(ν(σ)/µ(σ) (2.35)
The above equation is also known as relative entropy of ν with respect to µ. Now if we say that  is
the tolerable false alarm rate. Then the model free anomaly detector is given by:
I(F ) = 1{I1(EF ) ≥ η} (2.36)
Here η is given by η = − 1n log. I1(EF ) is given by relative entropy of estimated probability vector ν
with respect to µ. It has been shown in [5] that (2.36) is asymptotically Neyman-Pearson optimal.
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2.4 Model based approach
In model based approach we will discuss about another statistical approach for anomaly detection
i.e. Markov based approach. In Markov model we are using Markov chain rule to form a model of
the given flow data.
Markov chain process is a stochastic process to be a sequence of random variables {X0, X1, X2, ....}
or {Xt}∞t=0 assuming values in finite alphabet A = {a1, ...., an}. We will discuss here about finite
state Markov process. A process {Xt}∞t=0 is said to be a Markov chain process if for t ≥ 1 and every
sequence a1, ...., at ∈ N t, we can say that
Pr{Xt = at|X1 = a1, ...., Xt−1 = at−1} = Pr{Xt = at|Xt−1 = at−1} (2.37)
So in Markov Chain model state transition occurs in one step. And again if state transition from
time t to time t + 1 is independent of time then Markov Chain becomes stationary Markov chain.
Here in this method model is formed assuming state transition as stationary one. A stationary state
transition MC probability is given as:
Pr{Xt = it|Xt−1 = it−1} = Pr{Xt = j|Xt−1 = i} = pi,j (2.38)
Therefore pi,j represents probability of the system in state j at time t such that it was at state i at
time t− 1. Therefore state transition matrix for this n number of state MC can be written as:
P =
p1,1 p1,2 · · · p1,n
p2,1 p2,2 · · · p2,n
...
...
. . .
...
pn,1 pn,2 · · · pn,n
Whereas we have some initial probability distribution represented as:
Q = [q1, q2, ...., qn]
qi is defined as the probability that the system is in state i at time zero.
This is an alternate method for anomaly detection. In model free approach we assumed that the
sequence of flows are i.i.d. i.e. all states are independent of each other. Whereas in this approach
we have an assumption states are dependent on it predecessor state. As we have seen earlier in
section 2.3 the states are same. But in quantized flow state
∑
(F ) = {σ(g1), σ(g2), ...., σ(gF )} each
state σ(gi) is dependent on state σ(gi−1). Hence in this model as per the above matrix equations
flow state transitions can be formed under Markovian assumption as:
EFB(σi, σj) =
1
|F |
|F |∑
l=2
1{σ(f l−1) = σi, σ(f l) = σj} (2.39)
In eq.(2.39) 1{.} represents indicator function. Where σ(f l) denotes a flow state in ∑ which f l
gets mapped to. Here we use Fref to form a finite state transition matrix. This reference finite state
transition matrix can be formed using eq. (2.39). The matrix can be written as:
pi = {pi(σi, σj)}1,j=1,....,|∑ |
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As we can see that state transition matrix is a
∑×∑. And again empirical measurement is evaluated
using same formula (2.39) with support
∑×∑. Lets say P is the estimated state transition matrix
given by:
P = {p(σi, σj)}1,j=1,....,|∑ |
Each state transition matrix under Markovian assumption is associated with probability matrix of
the form {p(σj |σi)}1,j=1,....,|∑ | where p(σj |σi) = p(σi, σj)/p(σi). Where p(σi) = ∑|∑ |i=1 p(σi, σj)
denotes the marginal probability of flow state in P. Now following a similar procedure as in i.i.d.’s
model free approach we apply Sanov’s theorem under Markovian assumption is given in [6] and [8],
we have:
H(P|pi) =
|∑ |∑
i,j=1
p(σi, σj)log
p(σj |σi)
pi(σj |σi) (2.40)
The above equation (2.40) is also known as relative entropy of P with respect to pi. Therefore in
model based anomaly detection method the false alarm indication rate for F is given by:
IB(F ) = 1{I2(EFB) ≥ η} (2.41)
As said earlier η depends on the tolerable false alarm rate. η is given as η = 1n log. Where  is the
tolerable false alarm rate. I2(EFB) is the relative entropy rate of the estimated probability matrix P
with respect to true probability matrix pi. Again as said earlier it has been proved in [5] that model
based detector is asymptotically Neyman-Pearson optimal.
2.5 Incorporating spacial information
Till now we have studied only about temporal information. Yet, activity traces of interest can be
collected in many locations and attacks at one place may be precursors or aftershocks of attacks
elsewhere. So we introduce spacial information as well in the previous models. Consider a traffic
activity as X1, .....Xn where Xi ∈ <d. Where Xi represents the network feature of interest in slot i
at all d locations we would like to monitor. Previous method can be extended from a scalar Xi to a
vector Xi. For large d one would need to estimate for longer time to estimate its parameters and the
anomaly detection algorithm would need longer samples to identify an anomaly. The only additional
requirements in order to incorporate spatial information in the manner suggested is that the network
elements must be synchronized and being able to exchange the time series of the network features
they monitor.
2.5.1 spatio-temporal anomaly detection by model free approach
We will first decide that we want to monitor d number of network elements. Now Y b
∗,j
t = Y
b∗,j
(t−w+1), ......., Y
b∗,j
t
represents w most recent partial sums of packet data of size b∗ with j = 1, ....., d. Now for each net-
work element we apply the temporal approach as discussed in section 2.3 to evaluate underlying
alphabet and empirical measure.
• Now create the multi-dimensional alphabet∑d = {α(1)1 , ....α(1)N1}......{α(d)1 , ....α(d)N1}. Then com-
pute the associated empirical measure (law) µd from past (anomaly-free) observations.
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• For every t we compute Y b∗t of w most recent partial sums and compute its measure as εY
b∗
t
w,b∗ =
vdt,w where d represents the network element. And this represents the fraction of occurrence
of
∑d letters in the trace Y b∗t .
• Same as scalar case we evaluate ρt,w and approximates the probability that the trace Y b∗t is
drawn from the probability law µd. We can use the same test as (2.36) for anomaly.
The parameters w, b∗ can be selected to improve the performance of the algorithm. After working
with the statistics as fiven in [8] it is found that b∗ = 3 and w = 20 are good values to work with.
2.5.2 spatio-temporal anomaly detection by model based approach
As before we assume d represents network elements or features we want to monitor. Suppose time
series of network activity is represented as Xjn = {Xj1 , ......., Xjn}, where j = 1, ...., d. For each time
series we split it into Mj subintervals or states for every j as discussed in section 4.2. Every Mj
is selected using AIC criteria [?]. By using this Mj we form a multi-dimensional Markov chain.
For example if sj1, .....s
j
M represents the states of every network element then by putting it together
we can form s1, ...., sd. Where Sj ∈ {sj1, sj2, ....}, i.e we are cascading every network elements
state in a series. In this way we form a trace Xn = {X1n, ......., Xdn}. Yt denote the output of the
multidimensional network at time t. Then:
• We will use past anomaly free data to form transition probability vector P d.
• Now for each consecutive time slot t we observe the output vector Yt,n = (Yt−n+1, ......, Yn)
and their empirical measures as εYt,nn,2 = d
d
t,n. Where d represents dimension of the Markov
chain vector.
• Then ρt,napproximates the probability that the trace Yt,n is drawn from the Markov model
with transition probability matrix pd. and then compare using (2.40) for anomaly testing.
2.6 SVM base approach
This is also a model based approach. We can say it as decision boundary based approach. Because
in this approach SVM forms a decision quadratic boundary between normal or regular activity and
unusual or irregular activities. This technique is also popular by the name of 1st class SVM. Lets
represent our dataset as X = {x1, ....., xX }. X can have values either +1 or −1. We have to find a
hyperplane
f(x) = wTφ(x)− b (2.42)
such that we can correctly classify a point x by its sign. Where w and b are constant vector and a
constant. φ(x) is a function that maps the test point to a hyperplane to get more accurate classifica-
tion. Suppose X data is not linearly separable then φ(·) takes it to some higher dimension where it
becomes linearly separable. Lets take an ideal case where every training data in X gets mapped by
φ(xX ) to a linearly separable hyperplane where
wTφ(x)− b = 1 and wTφ(x)− b = −1 (2.43)
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separates data in X such that
yi(w
Tφ(xi)− b) ≥ 1 ∀i = 1, ..., |X | (2.44)
Where yi ∈ {+1,−1} for all xi ∈ X . So per given in (2.43) and (2.44) the hyperplane can be found
by minimizing 12w
Tw. But in practice we hardly get a hyperplane linearly separable. So we try to
find a hyperplane with lowest possible misclassification error. To complete this task we update our
(2.44) as
yi(w
Tφ(xi)− b) ≥ 1− ξi ∀i = 1, ...., |X | (2.45)
Where ξi > 0. This allows a few misclassification error. Therefore we can find a hyperplane by [9]
min
1
2
wTw + c
|X |∑
i=1
ξi (2.46)
such that (2.45) satisfied and ξi ≥ 0. Here c is a positive constant. Therefore it can be written as
L(w, b, ξ, α, β) =
1
2
wTw + c
|X |∑
i=1
ξi −
|ξ|∑
i=1
αi[yi(w
Tφ(xi)− b) + ξi − 1]−
|ξ|∑
i=1
βiξi (2.47)
Where α and β are Lagrange multiplier vectors and are non-negative. Therefore by taking derivatives
we get
w =
|X |∑
i=1
αiyix
i (2.48)
Therefore from (2.46) and (2.48) we can say from [9]
|X |∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
|X |∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjφ
T (xi)φ(xj) ∀i = 1, ...., |X | (2.49)
such that
∑|X |
i=1 αiyi = 0 and c ≥ αi ≥ 0. Therefore we can find our optimizer named α∗. Then
we can find w∗ by finding vector normal to the hyperplane. Since the inner product φT (xi)φ(xj) is
there we can use kernel function to replace that product. Using the kernel function [10] the above
(2.42) can be written as
f(x) =
|X |∑
i=1
yiα
∗
iK(x, x
i)− b∗ (2.50)
Where k(u, v) = exp(−γ(u− v)T (u− v) and α∗ > 0. Those elements of X for which α > 0 are called
support vectors. These points define the decision boundary. Lets say Xsv ∈ X represents sets of all
points which supports hyperplane. Therefore b∗ is recovered by subset of those support vectors as
b∗ =
1
|Xˆsv|
=
|X |∑
i=1
1{xi∈Xˆsv}(
X∑
j=1
α∗jK(x
j , xi)− yi)
Now suppose training set X have only data of one type i.e. whose labels are all +1. Then the chal-
lenge comes how to separate outliers by using one-class SVM. So to do that we search a furtherest
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point from support vector points and consider it in outliers. Mathematically we are searching for a
hyperplane for a set of non-negative margins {ξ1, ...., ξ|X |}, represented by w and b i.e.
wTφ(xi) ≥ −ξi ∀i = 1, ..., |X |
We can find this hyperplane by QP [11]
min
1
2
wTw +
1
v|X |
|X |∑
i=1
ξi − b ∀i = 1, ..., |X | (2.51)
Where wTφ(xi) − b ≥ −ξ and ξi > 0. Where v is a tunable parameter. It is used for separating
anomaly. It is used for effectively tuning false alarm rate. As we know SVM uses binary classification.
Therefore the binary classification can be written as
min
1
2
|X |∑
i,j=1
αiαjK(x
i, xj) (2.52)
Such that
∑|X |
i=1 αi = 1 and 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1v|X | . Here optimal α∗ represents those support vectors in X
which are used for anomaly detection.
2.6.1 First approach
For network anomaly detection flow based method is used for SVM. Consider a sequence of norm
flows for training purpose F = {f1, ...., f |F |}. Where each flow is represented as f i = {ki, d(wi), bi, ti, dit}.
We don’t use time element in flow because in flow base SVM importance of time of transmission is
very low. Time is important when we use time specific SVM where we see which server has how
much at that specific time. But in this case time has low importance. So we ignore time for the time
being. And we also omit cluster center from flow sequences for SVM operation because each cluster
center represents a normal user. And distance from a normal user is more important than name of
cluster center. Now the new data set can be written as Z = z1, ...., z|Z|. Where zi = d(wi), bi, dit.
Therefore the redial basis vector compares test data against normal dataset. The anomaly detector
can be represented as
sgn(f(z)) = sgn(
|Z|∑
i=1
α∗iK(z
i, z)− b∗) (2.53)
Where K(·, ·) can be written as:
min
1
2
|Z|∑
i,j=1
αiαjK(z
i, zj) (2.54)
such that
∑|Z|
i=1 αi = 1 and 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1v|Z| . Here v is the allowable false alarm rate. And b∗ is given
by
b∗ =
1
|Zˆsv|
|Z|∑
i=1
1{zi∈Zˆsv}
|Z|∑
j=1
α∗jK(z
i, zj) (2.55)
Where Zˆsv = {zi ∈ Z : 0 < α∗i < 1v|Z|}
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2.6.2 Second approach
Here in second approach we use combination of model free approach and model based approach
along with SVM to find anomalies from traffic. It is a window based anomaly detection approach.
For each window i with flows Fi, we evaluate model free empirical measures as discussed in section
3. So for each Fi we get an empirical measure EFi . Same sequence of flows are used in Markov
model based approach as discussed in section 4 and we evaluate empirical estimates EFiB . Then we
create a sequence of feature vector for window i as
Y j = {EGi ,EGiB , |Gi|}
Then we use a series of windows say Y = {Y 1, ....., Y |Y|}. Now we apply SVM approach on these
windows to find anomalies. Since the dimensionality of the Y j is to high so we use PCA first to
reduce the dimensionality.
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Chapter 3
Contribution
In statistical approach with Markov models we always assume that samples or events generated by
Markov process. We use sample path from traffic for estimating State transition matrix(STM) and
stationary distribution. The sample path for training models always have some length l. Because
when we start using our model for a system we have a time constraint with us for training those
models. Sample path of length l does not give true STM which generating those samples. So when
we have finite sample length l we always get estimated parameters of the model. This true values
and estimated values has some difference. Lets call these differences an error. This error can be
positive or negative. Because suppose aij is true value of STM element and aˆij is the estimated
value of estimated STM. Then the error can be given by aij − aˆij . So we want to know how this
length of sample path effect the modulus of the error. In 1963 W. Hoeffding had given a theorem or
inequality called Hoeffding’s Inequality [12] and [13] for i.i.d. sequence. But the theorem was given
only for i.i.d. sequences. Here we have a markov process and the sample data in these sequences
are not i.i.d. So we want to extend this inequality theorem to find a relationship between maximum
error and length of sample path.
3.1 Extention of Hoeffding’s Inequality for Markov Process
Suppose {Xt} is a Markov process assuming values in [1, N ]. Denote these by {1, ...., N}, where
these are not integers but just labels. Suppose we look at a path of length l. Denote the sample path
by x1, ...., xl. Where xi ∈ Xt. To create a close path or cycle we create a ghost transition xl+1 = x1.
Based on this sample path, we form two estimates named as stationary distribution and STM. For
each index i ∈ [1, N ], we count how many times the state i occurs in the sample path for stationary
distribution and for each pair (i, j), we count how many times the pair ij occurs in the sample path
for STM. In symbols,
pˆi =
1
l
l∑
t=1
Ixt=i aˆij =
1
l
l∑
t=1
I(xtxt+1)=(ij)
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Here aˆij represents elements of estimated STM Aˆ. where we take xl+1 = x1, to make these estimates
consistent; that is
pˆi = pˆiAˆ
We would like to estimate how quickly these estimates of STM Aˆ and stationary distribution pˆi
converge to their true values, namely true transition matrix A and the true stationary distribution
pi. For this purpose we would like to use Hoeffding’s inequality [12]. Lets say li = lpˆii, that is the
number of times that state i occurs in the sample path of length l. We know from the Hoeffding’s
inequality that
Pr{li > l(pii + γ)} = Pr{pˆii > pii + γ} ≤ exp(−2lγ2)
On the other side we can also write
Pr{li < l(pii − γ)} = Pr{pˆii < pii − γ} ≤ exp(−2lγ2)
Where γ ≥ 0 and γ ≤ pii. So now with probability 1− p we can say that
li ≥ l(pii − γ), ∀i ∈ [N ]
Where q = Nexp(−2lγ2). Now we can bound how close each estimate pˆii is to the true value pii.
Now we know that each transition is independent of every other transition. So we can treat all of
these transitions as independent. Therefore, again by using Hoeffding’s inequality, we can say that
Pr{|pˆii − pii| > γ} ≤ 2Nexp(−2lγ2) (3.1)
Since we can say with confidence of at least 1 − q, that li ≥ l(pii − γ) for every index i ∈ [N ].
Moreover, if li ≥ l(pii − γ), then
exp(−2li2) ≤ exp[−2l(pii − γ)2] ∀i ∈ [N ] (3.2)
Since we know for a Markov process that
N∑
j=1
aij = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ [N ]
The above equation is also valid for the estimated value aˆij . Now as we know state i occurs li
times in the sample path of length l. Therefore as we each transition is independent of every other
transition we can write
Pr{aˆij > aij + } ≤ exp(−2li2)
Where  ≥ 0.Similarly
Pr{aˆij > aij − } ≤ exp(−2li2)
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Similar to the previous method by using Hoeffding’s inequality, we can say that
Pr{|aˆij − aij | > } ≤ 2Nexp(−2li2) ∀(i, j) ∈ [N ]
By using the previous eq. (3.2) we can say that
Pr{|aˆij − aij | > } ≤ 2Nexp(−2l(pii − γ)2) ∀(i, j) ∈ [N ] (3.3)
Therefore by combining all these estimates leads to the following final conclusion. Suppose
γ < min
i
pii
Then, for every  ≥ 0 (accuracy parameter) and length l, we can say from eq. 3.1 and 3.3 with
confidence of at least 1− r that
Pr{|aˆij − aij | ≤ } ≤ 1− 2Nexp(−2l(pii − γ)2)− 2Nexp(−2lγ2) ∀(i, j) ∈ [N ] (3.4)
Where r can be written as
r = 2Nexp(−2l(pii − γ)2) + 2Nexp(−2lγ2)
Therefore the final inequality for Markov estimates and true values can be given as
Pr{|aˆij − aij | > } ≤ 2Nexp(−2l(pii − γ)2) + 2Nexp(−2lγ2) ∀(i, j) ∈ [N ] (3.5)
This inequality can be extended for a s-step Markov processes as well. As studied earlier in
subsection 2.1.2 a s-step Markov process can be represented as one step Markov process. As we
have seen that in s step Markov process the dimension of STM becomes ns × ns. And stationary
distribution also becomes ns dimensional. To proof Hoeffding’s inequality for s-step Markov process
lets assume all the notations are same as in Markov chain case. So l represents sample path length.
Xt is a Markov process assuming values in same label index [N ]. Here also we create closed path by
using ghost transition xl+1 = xl. But here in this case lets say u = Xtt−s+1 and v = X
t−1
t−s . And lets
say Zt is a new representation of Markov process Xt as Zt = Xtt−s+1. So in this case we can say Zt
is a Markov process as :
Pr{Zt = u|Zt−1 = v} = Pr{Xt = u|Xt−1t−s = v} (3.6)
So each index (u, v) ∈ Ns. So we count how many times u occurs in sample path to estimate
stationary distribution and how many times u v pair occurs in sample path. Here u v = Xtt−s. In
symbols,
piu =
1
l
l∑
t=1
Izt=u
ˆbu v =
1
l
l∑
t=1
I(ztzt+1)=(u v)
Here lets say pi and B represents true matrices of Markov process. As we can see (3.1) it does not
affected by matrices dimension. So it remains same as above. Because |pˆi − pi| represents infinity
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norm of that vector which is independent of length of the vector. So though length of vector changed
because of s-step Markov process, max difference between its element remains unaffected. So we
are using the same notions for s-step Markov process except for STM matrix B and its element bij .
So from (3.2) and (3.3) it can be written as:
exp(−2lu2) ≤ exp[−2l(piu − γ)2] ∀u ∈ [Ns] (3.7)
Pr{|bˆu v − bu v| > } ≤ 2Nsexp(−2l(piu − γ)2) ∀(u, v) ∈ [Ns] (3.8)
For  ≥ 0 and γ < minu piu. From (3.7) and (3.8) we can say with confidence 1− q that
Pr{|bˆu v − bu v| ≤ } ≤ 1− 2Nsexp(−2l(piu − γ)2)− 2Nsexp(−2lγ2) ∀(u, v) ∈ [Ns] (3.9)
Where q can be written as
r = 2Nsexp(−2l(piu − γ)2) + 2Nsexp(−2lγ2)
Therefore from above inequality (3.9), we can write final inequality for s-step Markov process by
this equation.
Pr{|aˆt−s,t − at−s,t| > } ≤ 2Nsexp(−2l(pii − γ)2) + 2Nsexp(−2lγ2) (3.10)
Where aˆt−s,t = aˆt−s.....aˆt and similarly at−s,t = at−s.....at. But here in the above equation
stationary distribution pii is different from the the previous one. Here our state transition matrix is
of Ns ∗Ns. So we can say practically we have Ns states. So stationary distribution can be written as
pii ∈ Ns. Eq.(3.6) gives the final representation of Hoeffding’s inequality of a s-step Markov process.
3.2 Simulation
We have checked this inequality with simulation as well. We first create a state transition matrix
with N = 4 and N = 5. Then we generate sample path from that state transition matrix. And from
the generated samples we would like to see change in error  as length of the samples l varies We
have plotted the errors  for 1000, 10000, 100000 and 1000000. We run the simulation for 100 times
for each l to see the differences. We have plotted log(l) along x-axis and error  along y-axis. We
can see from Figure3.1 that error decreases as no. of samples increases. Figure3.1 gives us an idea
of errors Markov processes estimates with 4 and 5 states i.e. N = 4 and N = 5.
It seems obvious that error reduces as sample path length for training increases. But here in
above simulation we have chosen some probability where stationary distribution have some sort of
equal probability. That means occurrence of a state i in the process is approximately uniform. But
that does not happens in network process. Sometimes some states have much higher probability
whereas some states have very less probability. With this assumption a stationary distribution is
created as an experiment with 4 states. 3.2a and 3.2b shows the true STM and stationary distribution
which generates samples.
As we can see in stationary distribution that 2nd state has very low probability of occurrence. So
this probability can be referred as a very rare event. It don’t need to be an anomaly. But as we take
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(a) For N=4 (b) For N=5
Figure 3.1: error  vs. log(sample path length) log(l)

0.7778 0.0087 0.1918 0.0218
0.0010 0.0010 0.9900 0.0080
0.9900 0.0010 0.0080 0.0010
0.0010 0.0010 0.0080 0.9900

(a) STM[
0.2903 0.0032 0.0645 0.6419
]
(b) Stationary distribution
Figure 3.2: Example
samples generated by this Markov process shown in fig. 3.2. For 10, 000 training samples we get an
estimated matrix as shown in fig. 3.3. As we can see in fig. 3.3 that estimates are not good. Some
of the transition probabilities are even zero. There is also lot of variation in stationary distribution
probabilities as well. So we estimated these matrices with sample path of lengths 100000, 1000000
and 10000000. As we see in fig. 3.4 number of samples increased to 10000000, We have got a good
estimate. Those small transition probabilities like 0.0010 are also estimated approximately. Finally,
fig. 3.5 shows plot of the same matrix shown in fig. 3.2. Simulation has been done for this irregular
matrix with varying probabilities to check a graph of error vs. sample path length. Here in fig. 3.5
error is plotted w.r.t. log(l).
As its been given in [2] and [1] that MIT’s cyber data consist of 284 event types. That means
they have 284 states for Markov process. Then they have 3019 audit events in total from which
they have used around 1613 audit events for training of Markov model. As seen earlier that through
simulation data were generated from a known Markov process with known parameters depends
on the length of training samples. It has been shown that 3019 samples are very small for a 284
state Markov process. In that case Markov process will give many false alarms because it could not
separate anomaly with rare events. For an effective detection we need a lot more training data.
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
0.7731 0.0101 0.2001 0.0167
0.0000 0.0000 0.9773 0.0227
0.9897 0.0000 0.0091 0.0011
0.0010 0.0010 0.0107 0.9874

(a) STM[
0.3843 0.0044 0.0876 0.5237
]
(b) Stationary distribution
Figure 3.3: Example:10000 samples estimates

0.7780 0.0087 0.1916 0.0217
0.0009 0.0012 0.9897 0.0082
0.9898 0.0010 0.0081 0.0010
0.0010 0.0010 0.0081 0.9899

(a) STM[
0.2927 0.0033 0.0650 0.6391
]
(b) Stationary distribution
Figure 3.4: Example:10000000 samples estimates
Figure 3.5: Error vs. log of sample length (log(l)) for N = 4
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Chapter 4
Future work
Machine learning is playing a larger role in cyber security, which can in theory help identifying risks
and anticipate problems before they occur. The idea is to create a software which can adapt as per
changing attack strategies. Traditional security mechanism have leverage rules, patterns, signatures
and algorithms based approaches to detect threats. This is a problem, because these approaches
needs constant care and feeding to identify threats. But machine learning can change the game.
The benefit of machine learning is it works fast, detection rate is also high and can detect attack
vectors that are previously undetectable.
Up till now cyber security systems worked based on creating rules for detecting attacks. These
rules were created based on events happened in past. So it is something like ”what we know, not
what we don’t know”. So what we have till now best describes some machine learning i.e. algorithms
learn from data. But in future ”user behavior analytics” will come in picture. Where most of the
security breaches will be self discovered. This ”user behavior analytics” can also be known by some
other names. In this approach we predict attacks before happening by analyzing changes in user
behavior and predicting risks and breaches before they happen. Well anomaly detection methods
does the same thing. Because in pattern recognition we use signatures of known attacks to detect
attacks or threat to our system. So in that case we could not find the novel attacks or those attacks
which are previously unseen. But in anomaly detection approach we keeps user’s norm profile.
When a system detects something different from normal then it hikes alarm. Till now a few methods
of attack detection have been shown for anomaly detection. These methods are giving some false
alarms. Which needs to be treated. Statistical methods have low resolution because they can’t
exactly detect anomalous flows in the stream of data. But they provide stable results and they
have high detection rate. Whereas deterministic methods may have higher false alarm rates and
gives unstable results. They have high resolution. These observations suggest that as we need all
characteristics we have to find a way for handshaking those methods to work together. Because an
individual method can’t yield better result.
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